There is no systematic monitoring of global spreading of pathogens through international trade carried out by any organisation regulating world-wide trade in animals and their products. A critical evaluation of the impact of international trade provisions on global pathogen spread is missing as well. Data related to this kind of analysis are no more internationally collected. However, information on animal infection occurrence is of paramount importance for decision-making on animal health import conditions based on pathogen introduction risk assessment considering first of all the epizootiological situation in exporting countries. Actual international animal health information system covers just a small part of known animal infections and provides much less information on their occurrence and epizootiological characteristics than before (except for a few selected emergency infections). It provides the importing countries zero or insufficient data for objective risk assessment to avoid pathogen introduction through international trade. Illegal export/import is not recorded in any information system. The globalisation era trade requires much more efficient information system, including monitoring of global spread of pathogenic microflora through trade, as the basis for more effective international preventive and control anti-epizootic measures. There is an urgent need to re-establish animal health information system within the United Nations Organization as its inseparable component for follow-up execution of animal health technical assistance and global anti-epizootic programmes.
INTRODUCTION
Global epizootiological situation is deteriorating every day due to mass spreading of animal infection pathogens also through international trade in animals and animal products. This trade is regulated by: World Trade Organization -WTO ("Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures -SPS Agreement") and Office International of Epizootics -OIE ("OIE Animal Health Codes"). Manmade spread of pathogens through international trade has not been evaluated by these organizations and therefore the member country governments and their inhabitants are not informed/alerted about potential irreparable consequences for the future. Necessary data for evaluating pathogen spread impact of the trade regulation provisions are no more internationally collected. Immense multiplying negative sanitary, economic, ecological and social consequences have been steadily growing. On the other hand, global animal disease eradication programmes do not exist (programmes against foot and mouth disease and "peste des petits ruminants" are in preparation). Globally eradicated animal infection was only rinderpest in 2010.
Intergovernmental organisations can publish only officially reported data, reliability and completeness of which cannot be verified. The global collection, collation and publication of data on animal disease occurrence started in 1957 by the FAO/WHO/OIE Animal Health Yearbook Information System under the responsibility of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). This system was combined with the previously established OIE information system. Up to 1996, both systems were very well coordinated by a tripartite commission composed of leading officers of participating organisations, including also World Health Organization (WHO). The leading officers were in contact with all countries through common correspondence on global information system, including questionnaires, instructions and enquiries about information needs.*). When the OIE took over the whole animal health information system, the FAO was deprived of necessary information for executing the followup programmes (e.g. in 1990 FAO Animal Health Service was backstopping 218 field projects in about one hundred countries). The tripartite FAO/WHO/OIE information system was abolished and replaced by an OIE system eliminating the former role of the FAO and the WHO. **)
*) The last common letter to all countries was sent in 1990 signed by OIE (L. Blajan, Director General), WHO (K. Boegel, This paper attempts to document serious gaps in animal infection information system. It is based on data reported by the governments or by Chief Veterinary Officers (CVOs) to the OIE to be published in OIE World Animal Health yearbook (WAH) of two volumes -Reports and Tables, on  OIE (1978-1983 and 1987) and OIE Expert for Information Systems, were considered as well.
In this paper "infection" means the entry and development or multiplication of an infectious agent in the body of humans or animals. It includes also "infestation" -the external invasion or colonisation of animals or their immediate surroundings by arthropods which may cause disease or are potential vectors of infectious agents.
Insufficient knowledge of animal infection occurrence in exporting countries
Globalisation of pathogen spread through trade depends firstly on epizootiological situation in exporting countries where existent infections are sanitary hazards and represent pathogen introduction risk for importing countries. Therefore, the importing countries need comprehensive information on animal disease occurrence in exporting countries. The basis for such knowledge depends first of all on primary reporting by animal owners identifying any suspect infection. However, they are often afraid to report the case to the authority because of the risk of restrictive measures imposed (e.g. herd isolation, exclusion from trade, sanitary slaughter, etc.) and call first a local veterinarian. He also sometimes hesitates to report the case to public authority being afraid of eventual strict anti- In case of confirmation of an internationally reportable infection the information is sent to relevant international organisation for global dissemination. The above procedure is usually valid for clinically manifested cases representing in overwhelming majority of animal infections only a small part of all affected animals (pathogen carriers). New emerging diseases pose additional problems in the information system. Real epizootiological multi-etiological situation at country level is usually unknown (except for a few emergency infections such as foot and mouth disease). Thus international trade in animal commodities not considering this reality in exporting countries facilitates mass spreading of pathogens into importing countries unable to assess objectively pathogen introduction risks and identify effective protective import conditions. There were different approaches in collecting data on infection occurrence. FAO/WHO/OIE Animal Health Yearbook programme was collecting and publishing symbols of professional epizootiological estimates whereas OIE World Animal Health yearbook published also actual numerical data. However, at present, no country knows the number of affected animals and outbreaks of all internationally reportable infections. In many infections the ratio of real number of affected animals to ad hoc reported clinically manifested cases can reach a multiple of high values ("tip of the iceberg"). Invisible pathogens can be identified only by laboratory investigations.
Example: Toma et al. (1999) Active surveillance based on mass specific investigations (combining clinical with serological, allergic, microbiological etc. methods) of animal herds and populations provides the best information on specific infection occurrence. After a recent drastic reduction of governmental animal health services in the majority of countries due to minimising their budgets (this happened under the pressure of global financial institutions dominated by almost the same countries as the OIE), this kind of surveillance almost disappeared. The information is based mainly on ad hoc reporting of clinically manifested cases or post-mortem pathological findings. The author's proposal sent to OIE Headquarters (1/11/1994 and 16/12/1997) to include into the system the numbers of specific disease investigations was not accepted (Risk to discover minimal surveillance in exporting countries?).
More reliable and complete information on animal infection occurrence was available in countries with a strong, well organised and funded, centrally managed government animal health services independent on breeders, processing industry and traders. The main tasks were to protect animal health at country population level through free-of-charge regular preventive visits, systematic active control of multi-aetiological epizootiological situation and specific eradication measures supported by intensive surveillance investigations (including laboratory tests) to detect all specific infection outbreaks.
Examples: In Mongolia, in order to detect all herds affected by selected zoonoses, international expeditions of five countries during 1966-1968 carried out the following numbers of investigations: 5,046,070 in horses and 332,684 in camels on glanders by allergy testing (126,960 in horses also by complement fixation), 28,743,006 in cattle serologically on brucellosis and 3,408,875 in cattle by tuberculin (see more detailed information at http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/zoonosesmongolia.htm). In the Czech Republic during 1959-1968, in order to detect all affected bovine herds and to confirm specific disease-free status, annually there were carried out on average 5,030,449 tuberculin tests, i.e. ratio tests/population = 1.65 and 1,030,449 brucellosis serological tests, i.e. ratio test/population = 0.45. More details at http:// vaclavkouba.byl.cz/eradication.htm.
Incomplete reporting for global information system on animal infections
Many exporting countries send incomplete reports making it impossible for importing countries to assess objectively pathogen introduction risk through animal commodity trade. Country governments (CVOs), before making any decision on sanitary conditions for animal commodity import, should compare actual and previous epizootiological situation in the exporting country with the domestic situation which is known much better. However, there are no two countries having the same epizootiological situation and conditions for pathogen spread and control. Such comparison is often problematic when comparing the occurrence of infection agents only and not also their types or subtypes or even mutant strains (drug-resistant, highly virulent etc.) which are not subject to international data reporting.
Examples of some Salmonella enterica serovars isolated for the first time from imported animals and their products in the Czech The importing country must consider also other aspects such as previous experience with a given exporting country to avoid notorious pathogen exporters. When data on infection occurrence in the exporting country are missing, then carrying out an objective risk assessment of pathogen introduction in importing countries is impossible. Lack of necessary information opens the "door" for multi-aetiological pathogen import followed by post-import spreading of particular diseases. Reliability and discrepancies of reported data represent further problems for pathogen import risk assessment. There have been different data available on the same phenomenon from different sources. The situation is even worse when a particular country does not provide any report (e.g., in 1999 almost one fourth of countries did not send new reports or only incomplete ones). 
Reduction of reported data on epizootiological situation in exporting countries
In OIE World Animal Health 1997 yearbook a "new" significantly reduced list of disease occurrence codes appeared. This meant that much less information, needed for pathogen introduction risk assessment when importing animal commodities was available than before. The graduation symbols for disease occurrence estimates based on professional analyses, after decades of satisfactory practical application, suddenly disappeared instead of being further developed and made suitable for the incoming globalisation era. All disease occurrence symbols were replaced by one "+". The "new" symbol did not differentiate the degree of disease occurrence, i.e. no distinction was possible between e.g. one imported animal only or million local animals. Thus, paradoxically, the importing countries have been obtaining much less epizootiological information than before the onset of computer era. Evaluating codes related to disease introduction from abroad, reflecting also multiplying sanitary impact of WTO and OIE trade provisions, were eliminated without any scientific justification (Table 1) The codes for reporting infection occurrence, instead to be maximised for new and more demanding conditions of globalisation era, were illogically minimised as follows: The codes for positive occurrence: "+" Reported or known to occur; "+?" Serological evidence and/or isolation of causative agent, no clinical disease; an optional qualifier for the above two positive occurrence codes: "( )" Confined to certain zones". The change started as one of WTO/SPS follow-up actions*). Author's protest was answered by J. Blancou, Director General, OIE on 30/10/1998 that it was: "the result of discussions by eminent specialists on risk analysis… to standardize risk assessment". How could pathogen import risk assessment be carried out without necessary information on disease occurrence in an exporting country (a source of trade sanitary hazards)? This reflects the influence of major exporting countries having not sufficient knowledge on their own epizootiological situation and being afraid of monitoring pathogen export. Importing countries became "semi-blind" or even "blind" when deciding on animal commodity imports. After some further changes the OIE has established a system based on wording about present diseases such as "Clinical disease", "Disease limited to one or more zones". This has minimum informative value for importing countries. The exception is in a few emergency diseases where the OIE system is well elaborated, however, the report on the source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection is usually "Unknown or inconclusive". *) Report on the meeting of the OIE Working group on informatics and epidemiology, Paris 1-4 October 1996 .
Lists of internationally reportable diseases
In 1995 (1990), there were following lists of internationally reportable animal diseases: 15 (16) diseases of the List A, 80 (95) diseases of the List B and 32 (31) diseases of the List C, i.e. all together 127 (142) diseases. Additionally, there were also data on 23 zoonoses in human population collected and published in FAO/WHO/OIE Animal Health Yearbook as an experiment. The OIE, after taking over FAO global animal health information system in 1996, abolished the List C.
Definitions: "List A means the List of transmissible diseases which have the potential for very serious and rapid spread, irrespective of national borders, which are of serious socio-economic or public health consequences and which are of major importance for the international trade of animals and animals products"."List B means the List of transmissible diseases which are considered to be of socioeconomic and/or public health importance within countries and which are significant in the international trade of animals and animal products."
Later the classification of animal infections according to their importance was abolished as well. 
. to establish a single OIE list of notifiable terrestrial animal diseases to replace the current Lists A and B. The aim is drawing up a single list to be in line with the terminology of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) of the World Trade Organization, by classifying diseases as specific hazard and giving listed diseases the same degree of importance in international trade."
However, the author studying the WTO/SPS found no indication requiring to abolish disease classification according to their importance. This change was favourable only to those exporting countries being unable to eradicate some List A diseases and wanting to export animal commodities without a need to eradicate these diseases.
The European Union and Italy could not confirm exporting animal commodities as from a territory free of List A diseases due to African swine fever in Sardinia. In OIE documents texts can be found that are "forgetting" (?) ASF risk from this island or to mark Sardinia in global ASF outbreak maps (last time at 82 nd OIE General Session, 2014).
In 1998, the OIE abolished also the numerical disease classification and started using only verbal terms ordered by English, French and Spanish alphabets (not considering the difficulties for the majority of differently speaking countries) and thus seriously complicating pathogen introduction risk assessment for the importing country. This abolishment is difficult to understand in times of general digitalisation. In human medicine it would be absolutely unimaginable. The OIE has been "innovating" several times the names of many listed diseases (e.g. instead of simple "classical swine fever" is now "infection with classical swine fever virus" while "African swine fever" is without change; "rabies" is now "infection with rabies virus"; similar for more than ten other infections) confusing alphabetic orders. Why not respect the long established scientific nomenclature? The OIE information system is lacking stability and often also a scientific standard.
From the OIE lists "leptospirosis" as well as "Teschen enterovirosis of pigs" disappeared without any scientific justification and assessment of the risk for their spreading through trade. Both were eliminated also from the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code and thus abolishing recommendations for protective trade barrier against both diseases.
Leptospirosis, an infection important and dangerous also for humans and present for decades in List B (B056), was eliminated in spite of A. Thiermann Some important zoonoses are not included in the OIE information system: several zoonotic salmonelloses, Ebola virosis, Lyme borreliosis, the plague etc. The infections missing in the lists of internationally reportable diseases cannot be current subject of import risk assessment, i.e. their pathogens can easily be exported and spread mainly when the grade of clinical manifestation is zero or minimal. These infections are usually not controlled in exporting countries and consequently not detected and blocked in time in importing ones. Special global monitoring of pathogen occurrence in imported products of animal origin requiring microbiological investigations is missing as well. Investigations of internationally reportable infections are supported by OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines.
Examples: in 1988, Libya imported from Uruguay about 250 000 sheep; Libyan veterinarians visited this country to assess the situation for avoiding introduction of internationally reportable diseases; this import introduced a horrible myiasis -Cochliomiya hominivorax, never reported in the Eastern Hemisphere; this myiasis was included in the OIE List B diseases (as B060) as suggested by the author at 57. OIE General Conference, 1989. More in http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/SCREWWORMI.htm). (See Figure  3) . From animal products legally imported to the Czech republic in 1995 Salmonella serovars were isolated 55 times; e.g. 5 times Salmonella typhi murium from United Kingdom and once in frozen liver from France (Konečný and Látová 1996) . MacDiarmid (1992) listed 52 infections of livestock which may possibly be carried in carcasses, meat, offall or meat products.
Limited number of notifiable animal infections
There is no official international information about nonnotifiable infection occurrence available. There are no organised specific surveillance investigations or any national control or eradication programmes. Without specific epizootiological situation knowledge it is very difficult to guarantee specific pathogen-free export. In practice it means that the filter to avoid export of specific pathogens is leaky and has a negative impact on importing countries thus confronted with new problems that are usually difficult or unrealistic to solve. Almost in no exporting country are all internationally reportable infections obligatorily notifiable. In no exporting country a country-wide active surveillance system exists to detect all specific foci of all OIE listed infections. This creates a serious problem with the reliability of reported numerical data. Actual numbers of officially reported outbreaks/cases are usually lower than in reality (see Table 3 ).
Importance of reporting animal infections is underevaluated
Instead of collecting as much as possible epizootiological information to be available some very influential officers of the OIE HQs propagate a theory underestimating the role of this kind 1988 -1992 , FAO, 1992 of information. This approach de facto supports pathogen spread through international trade due to "information disarmament" of importing countries. The "philosophy" that importing countries do not need to know real animal disease occurrence in commodity origin territory, means a conscious indirect support of export/import of non-healthy animals and non-pathogen-free animal products. This concept unilaterally favourable to major exporting countries is being imposed upon all countries in spite of OIE repeated proclamations such as "Protecting animals, preserving our future!" In other words, reporting of infection occurrence in exporting countries should not be of importance for importing countries to know about it. These countries themselves are expected to apply "risk reducing tools" in imported commodities containing pathogens. This is obviously the reason why S.C. MacDiarmid, the key initiator of abused non-quantifiable "risk assessment" method in trade, belonged among those who contributed to the abolition of regular reporting data related to infection introduction and to the reduction of infection occurrence grading. This "clouding" information for importing country decisions has been facilitating export of non-pathogen-free animal commodities. The tendency to minimise information on epizootiological situation is reflecting the fact that many major exporting countries have no precise data on animal infection occurrence in their home countries. They are unable to control the diseases and have serious difficulties in issuing certificates guaranteeing pathogen free status. More in http://vaclavkouba. byl.cz/tradeinfo.htm.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
International animal infection information system has been formally improved thanks to its modernisation exploiting internet facilities and on-line communications. Appreciation merits OIE system related to some emergency infections using outbreak maps, immediate notification and followup reports, weekly disease information etc. However, paradoxically, in spite of this, importing countries have less key multi-etiological sanitary information for their decision on animal commodity trade than before. This fact has indirectly contributed to mass global spreading of the pathogens through international trade when governmental animal health services were minimised almost "ad absurdum" (barely enough for administrative activities). Therefore, in the majority of countries involved are these services unable to effectively supervise the "accredited" private professionals and diagnostic laboratories issuing sanitary attests and to control animal commodity trade on the spot. The situation is further deteriorating and becomes irreparable also due the fact that the number of national programmes for infection eradication in these countries is close to zero.
The OIE has been neglecting its role to monitor and analyse its trade provision consequences facilitating irreparable global spread of pathogens. Even in "Terms of Reference" of OIE global network of 247 Reference Laboratories and 49 Collaborating Centres, there is no monitoring of global spread of specific pathogens through trade included. The OIE instead of improving statistical information system to provide more and better information to member countries in connection with the new era of international trade, abolished the previous and functional system and replaced it by a new one providing less information for decision making on import conditions than before. This abolition was carried out without sufficient respect to information needs for international anti-epizootic programmes and for the decision on import conditions. Data on animal infection occurrence, instead of being further improved, were reduced and data related to infection introduction disappeared at all. Instead of facilitating importing country orientation when analysing the risk of pathogens introduction, the OIE system makes the decisionmaking process more difficult than before. The data, instead of being targeted at practical follow-up actions according to needs of individual countries, have been based on "ideas" of a very small group of theoreticians (having no responsibility for global health protection) and imposed upon the world not considering practical multiplying impacts. Unnecessary information changes and requirements complicate the work of public animal health services in all countries. The reduction of infection occurrence information has been contrary to OIE "risk assessment" method requiring a lot of information. The system must first of all serve to the threatened, i.e. importing countries. The OIE, as a non-United Nations intergovernmental organization, has never presented to member country governments any global analysis and information on mass long-distance man-made spreading of pathogens through trade. The OIE instead of trying to repair the damage caused by limiting and manipulating information for importing country decision-making, ignores the irreparable global mass spread of pathogens. The OIE itself, without member country government official clearances, has changed its name and programme including other veterinary problems (out of OIE international anti-epizootic duty/responsibility) being already "covered" by universities, scientific institutions and organizations, textbooks etc.
The global animal health programme executing organization was from the end of World War II the FAO while the OIE has been carrying out global professional information, methodological and advisory activities. Global animal health information system was understood as an integral component of the FAO system. Without reliable data on animal health in the world it is impossible to analyse the real situation and correctly identify the priorities for international operative actions and long-term programmes. The FAO lost its necessary influence on actual global animal health information system which now provides incomplete and underreported data on infection occurrence and spread. There is an urgent need to re-establish global animal infection information system of the FAO respecting its Constitution, Article I, Function of the Organization: "1. The Organization shall collect, analyse, interpret and disseminate information related to nutrition, food and agriculture.", i.e. including animal health. To monitor and combat global spreading of pathogenic microflora, along with alerting all animal health services and world public, requires a maximum of useful information on animal infection occurrence. More information at http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/globsurveillance.htm.
